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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LITIGATION AND CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO BE QUEER
Clifford Rosky
This essay examines how lawyers and judges have framed the question of children’s queerness in litigation over samesex marriage. First, it argues that in United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, the US Supreme Court
invoked the tropes of dignity, injury, and immutability to set the outer limits of sexual liberty for both children and
adults. Next, the essay looks back to the early work of queer theorists, legal scholars, and lawyers to unearth a more
promising vision of law’s relationship to children’s queerness. By juxtaposing how two judges approached the possibility
of the gay child in Utah and California, it develops a claim that has yet to be vindicated — that the US Constitution
protects every child’s right to be queer.
Marriage Equality: The Indignity of Victory
Three years ago, in United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined the word marriage as “a legal union of one man and one
woman” under federal law.1 Last year, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court struck down the country’s
remaining state laws that prohibited same-sex couples from marrying and denied recognition to
same-sex marriages performed in other states.2 As a result of these rulings, the federal government
now recognizes same-sex marriages and same-sex couples have the freedom to marry in all fifty
states.
Needless to say, however, these rulings have not realized the most profound hopes and aspirations
of the country’s queers. To begin with, both rulings emphatically declare that the institution of
marriage confers “dignity” upon couples who enter it. By doing so, they proudly privilege married
over unmarried persons. In Windsor, the Court repeatedly speaks as if the dignity of human beings,
and human relationships, was somehow derived from the government’s authority to recognize
marriages. In one passage, the Court claims that when the state of New York allowed same-sex
couples to marry, “the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred
upon them a dignity and status of immense import” (2692). In another, the Court refers to “the
equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their
sovereign power” (2693). In yet another, the Court explains that the state’s conferral of legal
“responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the person” (2694). In the
Court’s view, DOMA was unconstitutional because it refused “to acknowledge a status the State
finds to be dignified and proper” (2596).
In Obergefell, the Court could not plausibly claim that states like Ohio, Michigan, and Kentucky had
“conferred dignity” on same-sex couples. Unlike New York, these states had specifically banned
same-sex couples from marrying. Instead, the Court showers dignity on the institution of marriage
and applauds the dignity of the petitioners for seeking to enter it. In just fifteen pages, the Court
offers too many superlatives for marriage to present them in toto. The following paragraph, which
purports “to note the history of the subject,” is illustrative:
From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of history reveal
the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and
a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without
regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their
religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the
1
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secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not
be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons.
Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most
profound hopes and aspirations. (2594)
Even after the opinion turns to legal analysis, the homage to marriage continues. Relying on “this
Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions,” the Court posits that “marriage is a keystone of our social
order” — “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress” (2601). Quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, the Court posits that reverence for
marriage is a defining feature of the nation itself: “There is certainly no country in the world where
the tie of marriage is so much respected as in America” (2601). In light of the Court’s earlier analysis
in Windsor, it is hardly surprising that in Obergefell, the Court finds “dignity” in the decision of two
persons to marry each other: “There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who
seek to marry and in their autonomy make such profound choices. . . . The right to marry thus
dignifies couples who ‘wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other’ ” (2599 –
2600).
Throughout the opinion, the Court praises the petitioners because they have shown such
profound “respect” for the institution of marriage — like the Court, and the Nation itself: “It is the
enduring importance of marriage that underlies the petitioners’ contentions. This, they say, is their
whole point. Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of
their respect — and need — for its privileges and responsibilities” (2594). “It would misunderstand
these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect
it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves” (2608).
By this point, the Court’s spiral of dignification is almost too tight to trace: the Court
dignifies marriage; marriage dignifies the petitioners; the petitioners dignify marriage; the Court
dignifies the petitioners not only because marriage dignifies them, but also because they dignify
marriage. . . .3 Even so, one might hold out hope that the Court’s effusive praise is little more than
lofty rhetoric — what the lawyers call “dicta,” rather than the reasoning or “holding” of the ruling
itself.4 But in a remarkable passage, the Court insists that the “respect” that the petitioners have
shown for marriage is legally relevant and serves as a foundation of the constitutional claims that
they have put forward: “Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners’
claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor their submission” (2594;
emphasis added).
The implication of such “submissions” is readily apparent: while granting same-sex couples
the freedom to marry, the Court denigrates millions of unmarried persons and nonmarital
relationships. To prove that marriage is “a two-person union unlike any other,” the Court portrays
unmarried people as lonely and fearful: “Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person
might call out only to find no one there” (2600). In the opinion’s coda, this hierarchy of dignity and
respect is made painfully clear. On the one hand, the Court writes, “No union is more profound
than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family”
(2608). On the other hand, the Court notes that the petitioners’ “hope is not to be condemned to
live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions” (ibid.).
In expounding the importance of marriage, the Court emphasizes that the institution serves
to promote children’s best interests: “The right to marry . . . safeguards children and families and
thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education” (2590). On
several occasions, the Court observes, it has described the rights to marry, procreate, and parent “as
a unified whole” (ibid.). Without the “recognition” that marriage affords, the Court reasons,
“children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser” (ibid.). Although the
2
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Court insists that “the right to marry cannot be conditioned on the capacity or commitment to
procreate” (ibid.), it indicates that marriage dignifies children as well as parents — and conversely
that the responsibilities of procreation and parenting dignify the sexual relationship between two
married adults.
Homophobia: The New Child Abuse
Of course, there is something ironic about the Court’s invocation of procreation, parenting, and the
protection of children in this particular context. For many years, opponents of same-sex marriage
have insisted that procreation is the purpose of marriage, and same-sex couples cannot marry
because they cannot procreate. More broadly, however, the question of children’s welfare has long
played a pivotal role in the LGBT movement’s triumphs and setbacks. For a very long time, in a
wide range of settings, public officials have justified discrimination against LGBT people by
invoking what I have called “the fear of the queer child” (Rosky 2013: 607) — the premise that the
state has a legitimate interest in promoting heteronormativity and discouraging queerness during
childhood. The simplest version of this fear is that “exposure to homosexuality would turn children
into homosexuals,” but the idea is considerably more capacious, flexible, and nuanced than this
simple formulation suggests.5 In the broadest sense, it includes the fears that exposing children to
homosexuality and gender variance will make them more likely to develop same-sex desires; engage
in same-sex acts; form same-sex relationships; identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender; or
deviate from traditional gender roles.
Notwithstanding the LGBT movement’s remarkable progress in recent years, examples of
this fear are not hard to find. In Windsor, the opponents of same-sex marriage claimed that DOMA
was justified by the government’s interest in protecting children — specifically, in “promoting childrearing by both a mother and a father.”6 Because of “the different challenges faced by boys and girls
as they grow to adulthood,” they reasoned, it was “at least rational to think that children benefit
from having parental role models of both sexes” (ibid). As the term role model suggests, they
implied that children would benefit from having both a mother and a father by learning the
appropriate ways to be male or female, masculine or feminine, mother or father: “Men and women
are different,” they explained; “so are mothers and fathers” (ibid).
In the congressional debates over DOMA, the law’s sponsors were less cryptic about the
lessons that they sought to impart to “the children of America.”7 By posing a series of rhetorical
questions, Representative Charles Canady signaled that the law was designed to channel children
into heterosexual relationships:
Should this Congress tell the children of America that it is a matter of indifference whether they
establish families with a partner of the opposite sex or cohabit with someone of the same
sex?
Should this Congress tell the children of America that we as a society believe there is no moral
difference between homosexual relationships and heterosexual relationships?
Should this Congress tell the children of America that in the eyes of the law the parties to a
homosexual union are entitled to all the rights and privileges that have always been reserved
for a man and a woman united in marriage? (emphasis added)8
In a legislative report supporting the bill, Representative Canady cautioned his colleagues “against
doing anything which might mislead wavering children into perceiving society as indifferent to the
3
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sexual orientation they develop,” in order to protect society’s interest “in reproducing itself”
(emphasis added).9
In striking down DOMA, however, the Windsor Court found that the law was actually
harming children, instead of protecting them. In addition to finding that DOMA “injured,”
“disparaged,” and “demeaned” same-sex couples, the Court declared that the law “humiliates tens of
thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples” by making it “even more difficult for
the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other
families in their community and in their daily lives” (2695 – 96, 2594, 2595). As if that were not
sufficient, the Court added that “DOMA also brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples”
by raising “the cost of health care for families” and denying “benefits allowed to families upon the
loss of a spouse and parent” (2596).
In Obergefell, the Court doubled down on the claim that laws against same-sex marriage are
harmful to the children of same-sex couples: “Without the recognition, stability, and predictability
marriage offers, these children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They
also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no
fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus
harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples” (2590).
More than anything else, this paradigm shift signals the wholesale demise of discrimination
against same-sex couples in family law. As Lauren Berlant (1997: 1, 5) reminds us, US citizenship
and nationhood are perennially defined by reference to competing claims about children and
childhood. As a result, Lee Edelman (2004: 3) adds, both sides of any legal or political conflict must
be able to position themselves as “fighting for the children,” because there is no other side for
which one can fight. Once Windsor proclaimed that laws against same-sex marriage were “harming”
and “humiliating” children — instead of benefiting or protecting them — it was just a matter of
time until the movement won the freedom to marry and adopt in all fifty states.
This is good news for same-sex couples — or at least, for the “noble” and “dignified”
couples who are willing and able to enter into the “sacred” union of spouses. But it is bad news for
other sexual dissidents, whose lives are still routinely regulated in the name of protecting kids. If
Windsor and Obergefell signal that such groups will not win the law’s protection unless and until
they can plausibly claim to be protecting children, then it may be a long time before sexual liberty
comes to unmarried parents — not to mention anyone who engages in presumably less “dignified”
practices such as polyamory and sex work.10 It may also be bad news for the children of such
persons, who seem likely to remain pawns in the nation’s struggles over the prevailing definitions of
family life.
As Wendy Brown’s (1995) work predicts, the Court’s willingness to protect the children of
same-sex couples, and the couples themselves, was explicitly premised on the recognition of injuries
to both groups.11 To qualify for the Constitution’s protections, both children and parents were
legally required to identify themselves as vulnerable victims — literally “demeaned,” “disrespected,”
“harmed,” “humiliated,” “injured,” “stigmatized,” and “wounded” (Obergefell: 2695 – 96) in the
Court’s terms. In Windsor and Obergefell, then, the balance of power swung from right to left, but
the cult of the Child was reaffirmed (Edelman 2004: 19). Within the child protection paradigms
presented by both parties, children were always at risk, in one way or another. The parties have now
traded places in victory and defeat, but children have always been in need of protection — first from
homosexuals, now from homophobes.
Of Nature and Nurture: Obergefell’s Gay Child
And what of the queer child now? After Obergefell, do we know where our children
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are?

Sadly, no. In Obergefell, the Court offers only one portrayal of children being raised by
same-sex parents: the three adopted children of April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse. In the Court’s
account, the couple’s children were always gendered, but they were never sexualized: “a baby boy,”
“another son,” and “a baby girl” (2595). Despite the country’s long-standing fears about the spread
of homosexuality, the Court’s opinions in Windsor and Obergefell offer no comment on the
possibility of the protogay child — the elephant in the movement since long before Stonewall
(Rosky 2013b: 618 – 64). In both opinions, the children of same-sex couples are explicitly
recognized and protected, but the specter of a gay child remains invisible (Stockton 2009: 6 – 8).
Paradoxically, Obergefell does stake a claim that bears on the production of gay children —
but for queers, it is the kind of claim that only makes matters worse. In a painful attempt to illustrate
how the country’s attitudes about homosexuality have evolved, the Court writes: “For much of the
20th century, . . . homosexuality was treated as an illness. . . . Only in more recent years have
psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human
sexuality and immutable” ( 2596).12 Worse yet, the Court claims that the supposedly “immutable
nature” of homosexuality is pertinent — and again, possibly prerequisite — to the success of the
petitioner’s constitutional claims. After insisting that the petitioners have come to praise marriage,
not to bury it, the Court posits that same-sex couples have no other means to achieve such a
sanctified status: “And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path
to this profound commitment” (Obergefell: 2594).
The argument from immutability has many flaws, all of which have been
amply documented by queer theorists and legal scholars, among many others.13 Most
fundamentally, the argument proceeds from the troubling premise that same-sex couples deserve
civil rights only because “we can’t help it” (Schmeiser 2009: 1520 – 21). In this sense, the
immutability argument is an acquittal on an empirical technicality: a declaration that lesbian and gay
people are innocent of homosexual choices, because, being “born that way,” they had no meaningful
alternatives to same-sex relationships. As one court explained: “Marrying a person of the opposite
sex is an unrealistic option for gay and lesbian individuals (Perry v. Schwarzenegger: 969).
And it is not just gay adults who are innocent: it is the children of same-sex couples, too. In
Obergefell, the Court stresses that children being raised by same-sex couples “suffer the significant
material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a
more difficult and uncertain family life” (2600). In short, we cannot punish the kids for the same
reason that we cannot punish the parents. They are born into these families; they cannot help
themselves. By claiming that homosexuality is “normal” and “immutable,” the Court implies that
homosexuality is natural. What a bummer! There is no one to blame.
By positing that homosexuality is “immutable,” the Court implicitly presumes that gay adults
were once gay children — or at least protogay children, or gay teenagers. Strangely, however, the
Court says nothing more to specifically address the fear that allowing same-sex couples to marry
could influence the sexual orientation of children — not only the children of same-sex couples but
all “the children of America.”14 In this sense, the gay child is born in Obergefell, but it is kept just
out of sight, and just out of mind. As Kathryn Bond Stockton (2009: 6 – 8) notes, the figure of the
gay child exists only in the past, as an unmentioned memory in the childhood of gay adults. While
the Court insists that the children of same-sex couples are wounded — “harmed” and “humiliated”
(Obergefell: 2601) — it does not contemplate the possibility that gay and lesbian children are among
them. Simply put, the sexuality of these children is not mentioned. In Stockton’s (2009: 6) terms, the
children of same-sex couples are asexual or desexualized — and yet they are implicitly presumed to
be heterosexual.
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The tragedy is that the battle over same-sex marriage did not have to end on such a sour
note. Strictly speaking, the Court’s claims about the dignity of marriage, the need to protect
vulnerable kids, and the immutability of homosexuality were gratuitous. Without psychoanalyzing
the justices’ motives, one can say that the Court could easily have reached the same result without
relying on such troubling premises. If anything, the claim of immutability stands in marked tension
with the underlying logic of Obergefell: by upholding “the right to personal choice regarding
marriage,” the Court vindicated same-sex marriage as a matter of individual autonomy rather than
equality among groups (2599; emphasis added). Quoting a 1967 ruling on interracial marriage, the
Court observed: “The freedom to marry, or not marry . . . resides with the individual” (ibid., quoting
Loving v. Virginia). If same-sex marriage is an option for everyone — a fundamental right — then it
hardly matters whether anyone is “born” wanting to marry a person of the same sex.
While constitutional law is an imperfect vehicle for queer politics, the logic of the Supreme
Court’s earlier rulings — prior to Windsor and Obergefell — had left the Court ample room to
adopt a more promising vision of the law’s relationship to children’s queerness. In the sections that
follow, I give a brief genealogy — in queer theory, legal scholarship, and judicial opinions — of a
constitutional claim for children’s right to be queer.
The Early Years: Birthing the Gay Child
Since the earliest days of the LGBT movement, most advocates have responded to the
opposition’s fears of “recruiting” and “role modeling” by attempting to debunk them — to refute
them with arguments based on empirical data (Rosky 2013b: 665 – 84). In one case after another,
LGBT advocates have insisted that role modeling could not possibly work, because “the vast
majority of lesbian and gay adults were raised by heterosexual parents” and “the vast majority of
children raised by lesbian and gay parents eventually grow up to be heterosexual.”15 Above all, they
have argued that children’s sexual and gender development cannot be influenced by parents or
teachers, because a person’s sexual orientation and gender identity are fixed early in life and cannot
be learned, taught, chosen, or changed.16
Yet even as early as Anita Bryant’s campaign in the late 1970s, there were LGBT advocates
who presented a more ambitious challenge to the opposition’s recruiting and role modeling
arguments. One notorious example was Bob Kunst, a Dade County activist whom Bryant had
accused of handing out pamphlets about homosexuality at local high schools. Throughout Bryant’s
campaign, Kunst brazenly admitted that Dade County’s antidiscrimination law would provide
lesbian and gay youth with role models — indeed, he identified himself as “an absolutely positive
role model” (Clendinen and Nagourney 1999: 301), and he claimed that providing children with gay
role models was one of the antidiscrimination law’s principal benefits (Fejes 2008: 81). In a public
meeting at a local church in Miami, Kunst speculated that between 10 and 15 percent of children in
Dade County were already “homosexual” — in his view, “people were inherently bisexual; an
individual’s specific sexuality was in many ways a matter of choice; the goal was to explore it” (ibid.:
131, 67). He was especially fond of drawing an analogy between sexuality and ice cream flavors:
“Life is like ice-cream, there’s 38 flavors out there, you choose the flavor you want” (ibid.: 68). He
described his strategy in unapologetically radical terms, arguing that activists must “ ‘expose the root
of homophobic insecurity and call it like it is’ and be ‘outfront all the way through, redefining samesex and both-sex experiences in terms of the beautiful new role models they represent’ ” (ibid.: 147).
However naive Kunst may have seemed during this era, he was not alone in making such claims. In
1981 Gore Vidal wrote in the Nation that “a teacher known to be a same-sexer would be a splendid
role model for those same-sexers that he — or she — is teaching” (512).
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Queer theorists were not far behind. In 1989 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1991: 18, 23)
delivered a trail-blazing talk, “How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay: The War on Effeminate Boys,” in
which she railed against society’s widespread “wish that gay people not exist” and, in particular, the
lingering “desire for a nongay outcome” among childhood psychologists. In the early 1990s
Sedgwick’s battle cry was taken up by a new vanguard of scholars in other fields. In 1994, for
example, the psychologist Laura Benkov observed that in custody and visitation cases involving a
lesbian or gay parent, both sides tacitly assumed that children should be discouraged from becoming
lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Although she acknowledged that “refuting the worry that children raised by
homosexuals will themselves grow up to be gay was a pivotal step in the legal advocacy for
homosexual parents,” she emphasized that it was only the first step, because it sought to answer
“homophobic questions on homophobic terms” (Benkov 1994: 62, 63). She lamented: “It seems
society is not ready yet for a more deeply challenging response to the question of whether the kids
of homosexuals will grow up to be gay — namely, so what if they do?” (ibid.: 63; emphasis added).
Meanwhile, legal and cultural theorists were moving quickly to develop Sedgwick’s insights
into the academy’s first overtly legal and political arguments for the liberation of homosexuality,
rather than the protection of homosexuals. In 1994 Janet Halley published a withering critique of the
legal argument that gays should be protected by courts because sexual orientation is “immutable”;
the following year, Lisa Duggan (1994: 8 – 9) urged queers to launch a “No Promo Hetero”
campaign, in response to the opposition’s rallying cry of “No Promo Homo.” Although neither
Halley nor Duggan focused specifically on the context of queerness in childhood, they both invoked
Sedgwick’s work to articulate universalizing claims on behalf of all queers — indeed, on behalf of all
queerness — rather than the distinct minority of people who identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual.

Minor Disregard: The Child’s Right to Come Out
Within a few years, the law professor Teemu Ruskola (1996: 269) used the work of early queer
theorists as a springboard from which to criticize “the legal construction of the fantasy that gay and
lesbian youth do not exist.” Even today, Ruskola’s article “Minor Disregard” is still widely cited as
the foundation of legal scholarship on homosexuality and childhood. In the wake of Windsor and
Obergefell, his argument merits careful scrutiny as a kind of historical artifact of the modern LGBT
movement: the legal academy’s first brief for the judicial recognition of gay teens.
In this trailblazing article, Ruskola begins by explaining that according to “popular, medical,
and legal understandings of homosexuality . . . gay kids are not gay but merely ‘confused,’ ” and
“there is no conceptual space for a coherently gay adolescent” (ibid.: 270). Above all, he locates this
fantasy in “the seemingly indestructible myth of homosexual recruitment” — the axiom that
homosexuals must recruit, because they cannot reproduce (ibid.: 273). After painting this grim
portrait, Ruskola modestly argues that “gay kids deserve recognition, respect, and protection” (ibid.:
272). More than anything else, he emphasizes the recognition of gay youth — the act of naming
children as “gay” — as the primary way to respect and protect them: “The first step in the
protection of gay kids must be to see them as gay kids; unless the law is able to name the child, it will
be unable to safeguard him or her” (ibid.: 273). Based on this principle, he sounds “a call for the law
to recognize and protect the youth who identify themselves as gay and lesbian by naming them as gay
and lesbian, rather than as confused, presumptively heterosexual future adults” (ibid.: 274; emphasis
added).
In an especially provocative move, Ruskola means to challenge “the assumption that kids
cannot be gay in the first place” by asking “what if homosexuality is not a matter of children’s
derailed sexual development, of kids growing up to be gay, but of being gay?” (ibid.: 319, 320).
Against a world of doubt, he insists that children can be gay in the here and now, even before they
7
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are adults. He observes that despite the pervasive belief that homosexuality is only for adults, “it is a
fact — and a miracle — that there are youth who, against all odds, self-identify as gay” (ibid.: 323).
He emphasizes that “whether we call them gay kids or confused children matters a great deal,”
because “the act of renaming youth with same-sex erotic desires as gay or proto-gay has direct
implications for what it means to protect them” (ibid.: 324).
It is no wonder that Ruskola’s argument has been so influential and has stood up to the passage of
time so well. Twenty years ago, it was both visionary and brave to offer such a full-throated defense
of “gay and lesbian youth,” when the sociology on this subject was still new (Ruskola 1996: 270n4)
and queer theory had barely been discovered by law professors.17 And despite Ruskola’s (1996: 272,
274) polemical style, it is hard to quarrel with his basic principle that “gay kids deserve recognition,
respect, and protection” or his modest proposal that “the law [should] recognize and protect the
youth who identify themselves as gay and lesbian by naming them as gay and lesbian, rather than as
confused.” Yet Ruskola’s argument seems to leave behind some of the normative challenges
presented by those who preceded him — not only Kunst and Vidal, but Sedgwick and Benkov.
Each of Ruskola’s departures from this early work turns on his concept of gay and lesbian youth,
which imposes three distinct limitations on the scope of his argument.
The first limitation is readily apparent: Ruskola leaves the “B” and the “T” out of “LGBT,”
along with the Q, I, and A, for that matter. Throughout the article, he uses advocates on behalf of
“gay and lesbian youth.” Although he invokes the phrase “queer kids” several times, he uses it
synonymously with “gay and lesbian youth,” rather than in any more inclusive manner. He makes
only passing reference to bisexual children, and no reference to transgender, intersex, or asexual
children at all. While these oversights are unfortunate, they are likely a product of the time in which
Ruskola was writing. With the benefit of new insights, they are easy to fix. Rather than limit
ourselves to a claim on behalf of “gay and lesbian youth,” advocates can and do now insist that the
law should recognize the sexuality and gender of all children, regardless of whether they happen to
be lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, or asexual.18
But Ruskola’s use of the phrase “gay and lesbian youth” raises two other questions for
queers — questions that are less obvious but more profound. The first is the mysterious way that
Ruskola deploys the concept of youth, as if it were synonymous with the concept of child. Although
he often insists that gay and lesbian youth do exist, he uses the term youth interchangeably with
several others — adolescent, teenager, minor, child, and kid — which do not typically refer to the
same stage in a person’s development. In the opening paragraph, for example, he objects to the
fantasy that “gay and lesbian youth do not exist,” the belief that “gay kids are not gay but merely
‘confused,’ ” and the lack of any “conceptual space for a coherently gay adolescent” (Ruskola 1996:
270; emphasis added). The problem is not that Ruskola leaves these terms undefined but that he
conflates them in ways that confine homosexuality — reassuringly — to the teenage years. By using
narrow terms like adolescent and teenager as substitutes for broader terms like child and kid,
Ruskola seems to collapse the latter into the former — and thus to limit himself to a defense of
homosexuality in adolescence. If we ultimately want to make room for a coherently gay child, then
why object only that “there is no conceptual space for a coherently gay adolescent?” (ibid.: 270).19
This query raises the final limitation in Ruskola’s argument: What is a “gay” or “lesbian”
child — and what, for that matter, is a “bisexual” or “transgender” child? What precisely must a
child think, say, or do to be considered “gay” or “lesbian” and thereby qualify for the law’s
protections? In this argument on behalf of “gay and lesbian youth,” how is children’s homosexuality
defined — by reference to desire, behavior, relationship, identification, or by some combination of
these criteria? To such questions, Ruskola gives a straightforward answer: he presumes that to
qualify as “gay” or “lesbian” before the law, children must identify themselves in these terms. He
emphasizes that “it is a fact — and a miracle — that there are youth who, against all odds, self-identify
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as gay,” and he argues that “the law [should] recognize and protect the youth who identify themselves as
gay and lesbian by naming them as gay and lesbian, rather than as confused” (ibid.: 323, 274;
emphasis added).
This principle of self-identification is not problematic, as far as it goes: surely children
should have the freedom to identify themselves as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, if they
choose to. But as Sedgwick (1990: 42) once warned, “Many gay adults may never have been gay kids
and some gay kids may not turn into gay adults,” so the principle can and should be pushed a bit
farther. What protections might the law offer to children who entertain same-sex fantasies, harbor
same-sex desires, engage in same-sex behavior, and enter same-sex relationships — but are either
unable or unwilling to identify as lesbian, gay, or even bisexual during childhood? What legal
protections might exist for children who vary from traditional gender norms, but do not identify as
transsexual or even transgender? Using queer theory as a guidepost, can lawyers and judges articulate
claims not only for some children’s right to identify as LGBTQIA, but for the potential of queerness
in every child?
No Promo Hetero: Before the Law
It took several years before anything approaching Ruskola’s vision was articulated by lawyers
or adopted by courts. In two prominent cases — Lawrence v. Texas and Perry v. Schwarzenegger —
lawyers and judges began to build a constitutional case for children’s right to be queer. In Lawrence
v. Texas, the attorney Paul Smith argued the case for John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, two men
who had been convicted under a Texas sodomy law, before the United States Supreme Court.20 In
his opening argument, Smith told the justices that even when acts of sodomy were not criminally
prosecuted, laws against sodomy were often invoked to justify discrimination against lesbian and gay
people in other settings: “They’re denied visitation to their own children, they’re denied custody of
children, they’re denied public employment. They’re denied private employment.” In response,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist asked Smith whether his argument could be used to challenge a
school’s preference for hiring heterosexual teachers: “If you prevail, Mr. Smith, and this law is struck
down, do you think that would also mean that a State could not prefer heterosexuals to homosexuals
to teach kindergarten?”
Smith had prepared for general questions about how legalizing sodomy would affect
children’s sexual development, but he had not anticipated this particular question about the
constitutionality of discrimination against gay teachers (Carpenter 2012: 230). He cleared his throat,
and for a moment, he seemed to grasp for a way to distinguish between the two policies. “I think
the issue of — of preference in the educational context would involve very different criteria, Your
Honor, and very different uh, uh — considerations.” Regaining his footing, he proposed that “the
State would have to come in with some sort of a justification.”
Taking up Smith’s challenge, Justice Antonin Scalia gamely asked whether the state’s
justification could be “the same that’s alluded to here, disapproval of homosexuality.” Smith replied,
“Well, I think it would be highly — highly problematic, such a — justification . . . if that were the
only justification that could be offered, there was not some showing that there would be any more
concrete harm to the children in the school.” Now that the tables had turned, it was Justice Scalia
who seemed to struggle to express himself in suitable language: “Only that the children might —
might — might be induced to, uh — to, to — to, to follow the path of homosexuality.”
Given that Justice Scalia is rarely at a loss for words, the pauses in this sentence seem
especially significant. In 1978, then-Justice Rehnquist had colorfully compared the contagiousness of
homosexuality and measles;21 by 2003, Justice Scalia was apparently uncomfortable speaking in such
colorful metaphors. Rather than suggest that a gay teacher would “seduce,” “indoctrinate,” or
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“recruit” children into homosexuality, he felt compelled to articulate the fear of the queer child in
more neutral terms. But in another sign of the times, Justice Scalia’s attempt at subtlety did not seem
to pay off with the spectators. As soon as he proffered the theory that “the child might be induced
to follow the path of homosexuality,” the noises from the gallery were audible: some laughed; others
groaned.22
Of course, Smith did neither; he did not have such luxuries. He could have replied that
Justice Scalia’s claim was absurd because homosexuality was not a “path,” or something that would
“follow” from children being taught by gay teachers. But as Smith later explained, he did not want to
get himself mired in “complicated questions of whether sexual orientation is genetic or developed,
chosen or unchosen, fixed or immutable” (Carpenter 2012: 230). At the same time, however, he did
not want to concede that Justice Scalia’s claim was factually valid or that the state could legitimately
prefer to hire heterosexuals as kindergarten teachers (ibid.). Instead of challenging Justice Scalia on
empirical grounds, Smith replied that Justice Scalia’s logic was essentially circular, because it was
based on nothing more than disapproval of homosexual choices, or a preference for one group over
another: “Well, I — I think the State has to have a greater justification for its discrimination than we
prefer pushing people towards heterosexuality. That amounts to the same thing as disapproval of
people’s choices in this area and there has to be a more — more reasons and justifiable distinction
than simply we prefer this group of people, the majority, instead of this group of people, the
minority” (ibid.: 21). Without claiming that children were “born” gay — or more broadly, that
homosexuality was “immutable” — Smith had revealed the state’s concerns about children’s
heterosexual development as nothing more than a long-standing tradition of homophobia.
Seven years later, in the highly publicized case Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Chief Judge Vaughn
Walker invalidated Proposition 8, the California ballot initiative that banned same-sex couples from
marrying. In legal terms, Judge Walker’s opinion was issued by a trial court, so it was not binding on
courts outside California. But in cultural terms, it marked a significant step in the evolution of
children’s right to be queer. In his remarkable ruling, Judge Walker offered the judiciary’s only
explicit rejection of “the fear that exposing children to homosexuality will turn them into
homosexuals” (1003).
During the ballot campaign for Prop 8, the law’s sponsors had claimed that it would “protect
our children from being taught in public schools that ‘same-sex marriage’ is the same as traditional
marriage” (quoted in ibid.: 930). Because “state law may require teachers to instruct children as
young as kindergarteners about marriage,” they warned, “TEACHERS COULD BE REQUIRED
to teach young children there is no difference between gay marriage and traditional marriage”
(Prentice et al. 2008). To dramatize this danger, the campaign aired a television commercial in which
a young girl tells her mother: “Mom, guess what I learned in school today? . . . I learned that a prince
can marry a prince, and I can marry a princess!” (Perry: 990).
When Prop 8’s sponsors were hauled into court, however, they took pains to distance
themselves from the campaign’s fiery rhetoric. Rather than claiming that Prop 8 could be justified by
the notion that “exposure to homosexuality would turn children into homosexuals,” they claimed
that the law was designed only “to protect children from learning about same-sex marriage in
school” (1003). Perhaps because they sensed the weakness of this argument, they declined to explain
why children should be protected from learning about this particular subject. Instead, they sought to
justify Prop 8 only on other grounds — as a way to preserve “the traditional institution of
marriage,” foster “naturally procreative relationships,” and protect “the . . . rights of individuals and
institutions that oppose same-sex marriage on religious and moral grounds” (998 – 1001).
Judge Walker was not fooled by this bait-and- switch tactic. Drawing on expert testimony to
place the Prop 8 campaign in “historical context,” the judge found that the campaign’s
advertisements “insinuated that learning about same-sex marriage could make a child gay or lesbian
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and that parents should dread having a gay or lesbian child” (998). Based on “the evidence at trial,”
he concluded that both of these fears were “completely unfounded” (1003).
At first glance, this sentence appears to be a classic restatement of the LGBT movement’s
immutability apologetics: “Don’t worry folks, homosexuality is not contagious. Kids are born gay or
straight, so there’s nothing to fear.” By invoking the facts, rather than the law, Judge Walker initially
seems to attack the empirical premise that queerness could be contained, without challenging the
normative premise that queerness should be contained. But a closer reading of Perry reveals that
Judge Walker’s reference to “the evidence presented at trial” is misleading, because it does not refer
to the kind of evidence that one would expect — evidence that sexual orientation is immutable.
Elsewhere in his ruling, Judge Walker offers a long list of “findings of fact” — eighty in all — based
on his review of the evidence presented at trial (953 – 91). In one of these eighty findings, he does
conclude that “individuals do not generally choose their sexual orientation” and that “no credible
evidence supports a finding that an individual may, through conscious decision, therapeutic
intervention or any other method, change his or her sexual orientation” (966). But he does not rely
on this finding as one of the reasons for rejecting “the fear that exposing children to homosexuality
would turn them into homosexuals” or the notion that “parents should dread having children who
are not heterosexuals” (1003).
Instead, Judge Walker cites fourteen other findings to support his statement that “these fears
were completely unfounded” (1003). His first finding is better characterized as a conclusion of law,
rather than a finding of fact: “California has no interest in asking gays and lesbians to change their
sexual orientation or in reducing the number of gays and lesbians in California” (967). Even if
California could change gays and lesbians, he reasons, the government would not have any legitimate
reason for doing so. Why not? Because, as he explained, “same-sex sexual orientation does not result
in any impairment in judgment or general social and vocational capabilities,” “sexual orientation is
not related to an individual’s ability to contribute to society or perform in the workplace,” and
finally, “same-sex couples are identical to opposite-sex couples in the characteristics relevant to the
ability to form successful marital unions” (ibid.). Instead of finding that a person’s sexual orientation
is biologically determined, Walker declares that it just does not matter, because a person’s sexual
orientation is not legally relevant.
To assess how Judge Walker’s argument builds on Ruskola’s, it is helpful to compare the
Perry opinion to Judge Robert Shelby’s opinion in Kitchen v. Herbert, another highly publicized
same-sex marriage case.23 In 2013, shortly after Windsor was decided, Judge Shelby was asked to
review the constitutionality of Amendment 3, Utah’s law that banned same-sex couples from
marrying (1181). As one would expect, Judge Shelby subjected Utah’s law to the same framework
that the Supreme Court had laid out in Windsor. After recognizing that “roughly 3,000 children are
currently being raised by same-sex couples in Utah,” Judge Shelby reasoned that “these children are .
. . worthy of the State’s protection, yet Amendment 3 harms them for the same reasons that the
Supreme Court found that DOMA harmed the children of same-sex couples” (1212). Quoting
extensively from Windsor, he explained that “Amendment 3 ‘humiliates . . . thousands of children
now being raised by same-sex couples,’ ” and that “Amendment 3 ‘also brings financial harm to
children of same-sex couples’ ” (ibid.). After laying out the Supreme Court’s analysis of the harms in
Windsor, Judge Shelby then extended the same principle to “children . . . who themselves are gay or
lesbian” (1213): “Finally, Utah’s prohibition of same-sex marriage further injures the children of both
opposite-sex and same-sex couples who themselves are gay or lesbian, and who will grow up with the knowledge
that the State does not believe they are as capable of creating a family as their heterosexual friends”
(ibid.; emphasis added).
Responding to Ruskola’s prophetic call, Judge Shelby pushed the law’s recognition of gay
children yet another step forward. Unlike the Supreme Court in Obergefell, Judge Shelby explicitly
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recognized that his jurisdiction included “children . . . who . . . are gay or lesbian,” and he specifically
imagined how the state’s marriage laws would affect them. In this respect, Judge Shelby’s opinion is
even more ambitious than Judge Walker’s: whereas Judge Walker imagined the possibility of a
lesbian or gay child, Judge Shelby acknowledged the actual existence of “children who . . . are gay or
lesbian.”
Ultimately, however, Judge Shelby’s analysis falls back on the gratuitous rhetoric of “harm”
and “humiliation” articulated by the Supreme Court in Windsor. Rather than insisting that Utah had
“no interest” in encouraging children to be heterosexual, he focused on how the state had injured
“children who . . . are gay or lesbian.” But as Paul Smith and Judge Walker demonstrate, the
rhetorics of injury and identity are not only unfortunate but unrequired. To reject the fear of the
queer child, lawyers and judges need not prove that sexual orientation is “immutable” — or even
that some children really “are” lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Drawing on a long line of Supreme Court
cases before Windsor and Obergefell, they can maintain that the state has no interest in promoting
heteronormativity during childhood, for the same reasons that it has no interest in promoting
heteronormativity at any age. Simply put, the state can offer no independent justification for
encouraging children to be “straight” or discouraging them from being “queer.” As a result, the state
must adopt a neutral stance vis-à- vis the trajectory of children’s sexual and gender development.
Borrowing from Duggan’s “Queering the State” (1994), we might call this the doctrine of “No
Promo Hetero.”
I have published an extended analysis of the constitutional foundations for this claim in
other work (Rosky 2013a: 434 – 500), so I sketch only the broad contours of my legal argument
here. Building on a schema familiar to legal scholarship on LGBT rights, No Promo Hetero
challenges the state’s interest in promoting heterosexuality in childhood by articulating a tripartite
defense of children’s speech, status, and conduct. It argues that these three aspects of children’s
sexuality and gender are connected to and protected by the Constitution’s free speech, equal
protection, and due process guarantees. When the state asserts that the promotion of
heteronormativity in childhood is a legitimate state interest, it violates at least one if not all of these
guarantees. When the state targets children’s speech, it engages in a form of “viewpoint
discrimination” that violates the free speech protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
(ibid.: 436 – 44, 465 – 69). When the state targets children’s status, it betrays a form of “class-based
animus” that violates the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
(ibid.: 444 – 53, 469 – 73). When the state targets children’s relationships, it evinces a form of
“moral disapproval” that violates the due process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments (ibid.: 453 – 58, 473 – 78). Taken together, these constitutional guarantees prohibit the
state from attempting to regulate the sexual and gender valence of children’s speech, status, and
conduct. By doing so, they establish every child’s right to be queer.
The latter claim may seem surprising, given that the arguments presented by Smith and
Walker were focused exclusively on the state’s authority to prevent adults from influencing
children’s sexual and gender development. But a child’s right to be queer follows logically from
traditional liberal understandings of the relationship between the state’s authority and individual
rights. In the legal imaginary of the United States, individual liberty has traditionally been
conceptualized in negative terms — as a freedom from governmental restraints, rather than an
entitlement to governmental benefits.24 Within this syllogism, every limit on the government’s
authority can be understood as an individual right and vice versa.
In light of this logic, the doctrine of No Promo Hetero inherently entails every child’s right
to be queer. Like all children’s rights — indeed, like all constitutional rights — a child’s right to be
queer is not absolute. It must be balanced against a parent’s right to direct the care, custody, and
control of her child and the state’s interest in protecting all children’s welfare. But within these
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parameters, every child has a right to an “open future” in sexual and gender development — at the
very least, an equal liberty to be straight or queer.25
Law’s Limits
Of course, even if this claim of No Promo Hetero were vindicated by the Supreme Court, it too
would offer no panacea for queers. As Duggan (1994: 10 – 11) herself cautions, “Because this case is
formulated within the terms of liberalism, it may trap us in as many ways as it releases us.” In
particular, Duggan worries that No Promo Hetero “seems to construct a zone of liberty in negative
relation to the state,” insofar as “it argues about what the state canNOT do” (ibid.: 11).26 Duggan’s
qualms about the limits of liberalism are especially relevant in the context of childhood. Because
children are less physically and emotionally developed than adults, they do not enjoy the same
degree of autonomy, especially with regard to sexuality and gender.
At the most obvious level, the Constitution does not grant children the legal authority to
consent to sexual relations. Although the age of sexual consent varies from state to state, it falls
between the ages of sixteen and eighteen in all US jurisdictions. In the 1970s, when a plaintiff asked
the Supreme Court to recognize “a right of minors as well as adults to engage in private consensual
sexual behavior,” two justices wrote separately to reject this claim as “frivolous.”27 Even in
Lawrence v. Texas — which recognized the individual’s liberty to choose homosexual relationships
— the Court emphasized that “the present case does not involve minors” but rather “two adults
who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle.”28
In addition, the regulation of children’s sexual and gender development is substantially
privatized: it is governed by family, friends, surrogates, and social norms more than teachers, judges,
and legal rules. And within the domain of family law, it is parents who rule the roost. Nearly one
hundred years ago, the Supreme Court held that parents have the fundamental right to direct the
care, custody, and control of a child,29 and the Court has reaffirmed this principle in recent years.30
Under this doctrine, the state must presume that a parent acts in her child’s best interests unless a
court determines that the child has been abused or neglected, or that the parent is no longer fit to
care for the child.31
Whatever one thinks of these distributions of power among parent, state, and child, the
doctrine of No Promo Hetero need not disrupt them. Within broad boundaries, the principle allows
the government to prohibit children from engaging in sexual relations, just as the laws in all fifty
states already do. This does not imply, however, that the principle has no bearing on children’s
sexual liberties. In State v. Limon, for example, the Kansas Supreme Court struck down a law that
imposed harsher punishments on minors who engaged in same-sex behavior than minors who
engaged in other-sex behavior.32 Similarly, in Nguon v. Wolf, a federal court in California held that
a public school could not discipline students for displaying same-sex affections unless it imposed the
same sanctions on students for displaying other-sex affections.33 And finally, in McMillen v.
Itawamba County School District, a federal court in Mississippi ruled that a public school could not
prohibit a female student from bringing her girlfriend to the prom or wearing a tuxedo.34 Even if
the Constitution does not offer children a broad liberty to engage in sexual conduct, it still protects
every child’s equal liberty to choose between same-sex or other-sex conduct.35
Within similarly broad boundaries, the principle of No Promo Hetero permits parents to do
precisely what it prohibits the government from doing — attempting to influence the trajectory of
children’s sexual and gender development. Under this regime, some parents would encourage
children to be straight, others would encourage them to be queer, and still others would take a
neutral stance, granting children the freedom to answer such questions for themselves. But within
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what boundaries? For present purposes, the existing body of abuse and neglect law provides a
plausible starting point. At a minimum, federal law effectively establishes that parents may not act in
a manner that causes a child’s “death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse, or
exploitation, or . . . presents an imminent risk of serious harm.”36 So even if parents attempt to
encourage children to be straight or discourage children from being queer, they may not do so in any
manner that poses an imminent risk of serious harm.
Like many child welfare determinations, such cases would turn on the prevailing consensus
of physicians, psychiatrists, and psychologists who study child development. During the past several
decades, a broad consensus has developed among medical professionals that homosexuality is not a
mental illness and that therapies aimed at changing a minor’s sexual orientation are harmful and
dangerous (American Academy of Pediatrics et al. 2008). By contrast, the American Psychiatric
Association has only recently taken steps to destigmatize the diagnosis of “Gender Identity
Disorder,” which is now known as “Gender Dysphoria” (American Psychiatric Association 2013:
512). Even now, some licensed physicians continue to support “corrective therapy” for children
who receive this diagnosis. 37 Unless and until a new consensus emerges, courts may be less willing
to conclude that forcing a child into corrective therapy for “Gender Identity Disorder of
Childhood” is a form of abuse or neglect.38
But if we focus only on traditional settings in which the state stands in the background — a
husband and wife raising a child together — we miss the most powerful thrust of No Promo
Hetero. Liberal mythology aside, the state acts in loco parentis in a long list of ways, intervening
both directly and indirectly in children’s sexual and gender development. Adoption and foster care
are only the most obvious examples. When parents litigate custody and visitation disputes, they are
subject to judicial determinations of children’s best interests.39 In public schools, the modern state
is ubiquitous — in the hiring and firing of teachers, the setting of curriculums, even the acquisition
of library books.40 In public hospitals, physicians routinely designate newborns as “male” or
“female” and prescribe cosmetic genital surgeries and hormone treatments for children who fall
outside the binary model of gender and sex.41 Under the regime of No Promo Hetero, the fear of
the queer child would be banished from all these settings.
***
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court reassured the nation that the children of same-sex couples
— and the couples themselves — would dignify marriage and be dignified by it. In this historic
moment, the Court implied that society’s long-standing concerns about the spread of homosexuality
were misplaced, because “sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and
immutable” (2596). Forty years after the rise of the modern LGBT movement, the time has come
to defend children’s queerness on its own terms, rather than assuring the world that homosexuality
and gender variance can be quarantined. The state does not have any legitimate interest in
promoting heteronormativity in childhood, for the same reasons that it does not have any interest in
promoting heteronormativity at any age. The Constitution protects every child’s right to an open
future in sexual and gender development — an equal liberty to be straight or queer.
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understanding of the “freedom to marry” represented a troubling exception to this general rule
(2634). See also Franke 2004: 1414 (“It is wrong to understand the fight for gay marriage as a fight
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for sexual freedom or, for that matter, relationship-based freedom. Marriage is not a freedom.
Rather, it is a power”).
25. See Feinberg 1980, 124; and Rachmilovitz 2014: 1374.
26. To guard against this risk, Duggan (1994: 11) recommends “carefully fram[ing]” the argument,
first, “to emphasize that state institutions must be evenhanded in the arena of sexuality, not that
sexuality should be removed from state action completely,” and second, to “make the crucial
distinction between state institutions (which must, in some sense, be neutral) and ‘the public’ arena,
where explicit advocacy is not only allowable but desirable.”
27. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 702 – 703 (1977).
28. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
29. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
30. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
31. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
32. State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005).
33. Nguon v. Wolf, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
34. McMillen v. Itawamba County School District, 702 F. Supp. 2d 699 (N.D. Miss. 2010).
35. Although No Promo Hetero does not challenge the law’s sweeping prohibitions against
children’s sexual behavior, it does not thereby reintroduce the narrative of the “innocent child” by
way of the vulnerable gay child. To be sure, this “innocence narrative” is available, and it is
increasingly commonplace in discussions of the gay child. See, e.g., Gillman v. School Board for
Holmes County, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1370 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (arguing that a principal’s targeting of
gay and lesbian students “is particularly deplorable in light of studies which confirm the vulnerability
of gay and lesbian students”); and Gilden (2013: 357) (tracking the use of a “gay teen innocence
narrative” in several legal and cultural contexts). But in contrast to Ruskola’s defense of “gay and
lesbian youth,” the principle of No Promo Hetero does not depend on identifying any children as
LGBT or even identifying anyone as a “child.” On the contrary, No Promo Hetero claims that these
questions of identity are irrelevant, because the government has no interest in promoting
heteronormativity at any age.
36. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-320, § 142, 124 Stat. 3482.
37. Erika Skougard (2011: 1161, 1162 – 63) observes that “childhood gender experts are sharply
divided about the best treatment for . . . children” who are diagnosed with “Gender Identity
Disorder of Childhood.”
38. See Skougard 2011. In recent years, some legislatures have attempted to resolve this issue on a
statewide level by adopting a law that prohibits the practice of “conversion therapy” on minors,
effectively establishing that this practice is a form of child abuse. See Eckholm 2012. Although these
laws prohibit “sexual orientation change efforts,” they define this term to include “efforts to change
behaviors or gender expressions,” as well as efforts “to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic
attractions or feelings toward individuals of the same sex” (California Business and Professions
Code § 865(b)(1) (West 2013); emphasis added).
39. Rosky (2009: 257, 294 – 98) observes that in custody and visitation cases, litigants, experts, and
judges often express concerns that lesbian and gay parents will serve as “role models,” influencing
children’s sexual and gender development
40. On teachers, see Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 1340, 1347 P.2d (Wash. 1977),
upholding the firing of a gay teacher based on “danger of encouraging expression of approval and of
imitation” because “such students could treat the retention of the high school teacher by the school
board as indicating adult approval of his homosexuality.” On curricula, see Parker v. Hurley, 514
F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008), affirming dismissal of claims by parents seeking to exempt children from
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“indoctrination” through elementary school lessons featuring children’s books about same-sex
couples. On libraries, see Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), invalidating a school
board’s decision to remove “filthy” books from libraries at high schools and junior high schools.
41. See Greenberg 2012: 11 – 26.
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